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Executive Summary 
The UK ICT Strategy published on 30 March 2011 committed the Government to create a 
common and secure IT infrastructure based on open standards.  From 9 February to 4 June 
2012, the Government consulted on options for mandating open standards for software 
interoperability and data and document formats.  The current research contributes to an 
economic appraisal of the proposed policy by: 
1. Introducing open standards as a policy field; 
2. Reviewing the evidence on the competition and innovation effects of standardisation 
in IT systems; 
3. Assessing the regulatory constraints of mandating open standards under EU 
competition and procurement law; 
4. Considering certain options for the implementation of an open standards policy; 
5. Evaluating the costs and benefits of specific aspects of these options for government 
departments, delivery partners and supply chains. 
This review of evidence reported in the literature on open standards concludes that adoption 
of an open standards policy to encourage interoperability and more competition in the 
procurement process is likely to be advantageous.  Advantages include potential cost 
savings as well as social benefits such as allowing greater access to and transparency of 
information.  There remain areas requiring careful consideration, particularly in the manner 
of implementation of the policy, for example whether to adopt FRAND (Fair Reasonable and 
Non-Discriminatory)2 or to prefer RF (Royalty Free)3 licensing terms.  The literature calls into 
question the rationale for software patents and therefore the argument that FRAND is 
necessary to incentivise innovation.  The decision to include FRAND could be justified on the 
ground that it gives the greatest range of options, but it may also reduce choice and 
competition when the main potential competitor is open source software because of 
incompatibility between patents and some open source licence terms.  It is not clear that a 
level playing field exists between proprietary and open source software.  If FRAND is 
accepted, policies to ensure competition from open source suppliers, including pilot projects 
and dissemination of information to encourage uptake of open source software by 
government agencies may be needed. 
Specific benefits identified include a reduction in lock-in and associated switching costs; a 
reduction in the size and duration of IT projects and the sharing and reuse of IT across 
departments; encouraging innovation and opportunities for smaller companies to participate 
in contracts; and improving business and consumer interface with government.  
                                            
2
 The acronym FRAND (Fair Reasonable and Non-discriminatory) is used in Europe while RAND is 
used in the US.  FRAND will be used here unless referring to US literature.  
3
 The term Royalty Free (RF) has been ascribed various meanings including the unilateral or 
reciprocal non-assertion of IPR and royalty free licenses which are in other respects subject to 
FRAND terms.  While the precise RF terms can be important in specific cases, particularly when open 
source software is involved, for the purposes of this review of the evidence the important aspect of RF 
is that no royalty is charged for the use of the standard.          
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Glossary 
 
API    Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are a type of 
software interface in the form of a specification provided 
to encourage developers to write applications to enable 
software components to communicate and often to gain 
network effects.  
CAMSS Common Assessment Method for Standards and 
Specifications, an initiative of the European Commission's 
IDABC programme to initiate, support and coordinate the 
collaboration between volunteer Member States in 
defining and to share the assessment study results for the 
development of eGovernment services. 
Data File Formats  These specify how the data is encoded and stored in 
computer files.   
De Facto Standards  Proprietary interfaces which due to market share take the 
form of standards, an example is Microsoft‟s “.doc” 
document format. 
EIF2  The European Interoperability Framework v.2 
FRAND  Acronym of Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory is a 
principle for assessing royalties.  FRAND is used in 
Europe while RAND is used in the US.   
IPR Intellectual Property Rights. 
IT  Information Technology, a subset of ICT (Information 
Communication Technology) and associated with 
software rather than telecoms. 
NPEs Non-Practicing Entities have a business model intended 
to generate or acquire patents to licence the IPR to others 
rather than exploit the technology itself. 
Open Source Software  Software that is developed collaboratively and distributed 
under a license that gives the user freedom to run, copy, 
distribute, study, change and improve the software 
including access to the source code.  The freedom refers 
to liberty not price.  Other descriptors include FOSS (free 
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and open source) and FLOSS (free, libre and open 
source). 
Patent Ambush  Withholding information about patent rights from a 
standard setting organisation with the intention of 
asserting the patent when the standard has adopted the 
patented technology.   
Patent Thickets  Overlapping patent rights over an item of technology that 
requires innovators have to take several licenses. 
Protocols Protocols define and specify rules for exchanging 
information such as how to format and indentify messages 
to enable code to be written to the protocol.  The protocols 
enable the code to operate on more than one computer. 
Royalty Free  Has various meanings including the unilateral or 
reciprocal non-assertion of IPR and royalty free licenses 
which are in other respects subject to FRAND terms.   
SSO Standard Setting Associations are organisations with the 
purpose of developing, coordinating, setting and revising 
technical standards.  They can be recognised on an 
international basis, e.g. International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), a regional base, e.g. European Committee 
for Standardization (CEN), or national, e.g. British 
Standards Organisation (BSO) or a more informal models 
known as fora and consortia, e.g. OASIS. 
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1 Introduction 
Spending on software and related services is worth around €258 billion to the 
European economy, or around 2.6% of GDP.4 Software is the largest and fastest-
growing segment of the ICT market.5  As well as making a significant contribution to 
the European economy, software is a key driver of innovation and change.  
The public service is by far the largest single procurer of ICT services in Europe with 
an estimated annual spend of over £50 billion.6 In 2009 the UK Government 
acknowledged that it spends more on ICT than any other government, but had a 
history of projects with budget overruns, delays and functional failures.7 Government 
IT projects were considered too big, lengthy, risky and complex, and departments 
had independently developed systems which often did not communicate easily with 
one another.  A number of initiatives have been introduced starting with the review of 
existing contracts and the tightening of procurement controls.  Another initiative was 
the introduction of shared services, but its manner of implementation, often overly 
complex with limited standardisation, resulted in cost overruns and failure to achieve 
the expected savings.8 Most recently, on 30 March 2011, a new IT Strategy was 
published, committing the Government to create a common and secure IT 
infrastructure based on open standards.  
                                            
4
 Report of an Industry Expert Group “Towards a European Software Strategy” (March 2009) DG 
Information Society and Media . 
http://www.ictregie.nl/publicaties/nl_TowardsAEuropeanSoftwareStrategy_ViewsOfIndustry_v20.pdf 
5
 IT (Information Technology) is a subset of ICT (Information Communication Technology) and 
associated with software rather than telecoms.  This paper concentrates on IT although some of the 
literature reviewed covers both IT & ICT.  Some consider there is convergence between software and 
telecoms, for example Mallinson J., “Artificial Distinction between Software and Telecoms for 
Essential IP Disclosure” (ipfinance.blogspot.com, 2 September 2011).  In email correspondence with 
the authors (13 September 2012) Graham Taylor (OpenForum Europe) highlights a substantial 
difference between the business models of telecoms and IT where the former continues to extract a 
return on investment from within the standard while the later see standards as a catalyst on which to 
build value.        
6
 Susannah Sheppard, “The new European interoperability framework: opening competition in public 
procurement to both proprietary and open source software solutions and reinstating compliance with 
European Union procurement and competition law” (2012) 2 Public Procurement Law Review 47-67. 
7
 Rt. Hon. Francis Maude, Minister for the Cabinet Office, speaking in 2009 as reported in, 
“Information Technology in Government, Landscape Review” (HC 757, National Audit Office, 17 
February 2011). 2011 
8
 National Audit Office “Efficiency and reform in government corporate functions through shared 
service centres” (7 March 2012) HC 1790. 
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Open standards are those standards created by standard setting organisations, 
including fora and consortia, which meet the requirement for openness.  The 
European Commission EIF version 2.0, which is referred to in the 2012 Cabinet 
Office Consultation,9 defines “openness” in relation to the specification of standards 
thus: “All stakeholders have the same possibility of contributing to the development 
of the specification and public review is part of the decision-making process; the 
specification is available for everybody to study; intellectual property rights related to 
the specification are licensed on FRAND terms or on a royalty-free basis in a way 
that allows implementation in both proprietary and open source software”.   
There are many definitions of open and closed standards.  On the one hand “closed” 
standards have no regulation of ownership or licensing of intellectual property rights 
IPRs.  This could be a de facto standard10 or where one member of a Standard 
Setting Organisation (SSO) owns the IPR and effectively controls the standard.   On 
the other hand “open” standards have been defined as those in which the members 
provide their IPR so that anyone is free to use it.11  Krechmer suggests 10 criteria for 
assessing the openness of standards including requirements that all stakeholders 
may participate and that there are low or no charges for IPR.12  In fact most SSOs 
occupy a middle ground somewhere between these open and closed standard 
definitions, permitting their members to own IPRs but requiring the licensing of the 
IPR on specified terms.13  They are open in that the standard can be used, but 
proprietary in that the IPR holder may demand some form of payment which is said 
to offer a “third way”, where the IPR has some value but does not obstruct the 
standard.14  
                                            
9
 Cabinet Office, “Open Standards: Open Opportunities” (formal public consultation, February 2012).  
Björn Lundell (University of Skövde) in email correspondence with the authors (27 September 2012) 
points out that licensing on a FRAND term does not allow implementation of both proprietary and 
open source software as FRAND is incompatible with most open source software licences such as 
those based on the GPL. 
10
 An example of a de facto standard is “.doc”. 
11
 The Internet is an open, non-proprietary standard as the SSO which controls the TCP and IP 
protocols the (IETF) had a policy of not adopting proprietary standards.  The policy is now to prefer 
technologies with no known IPR claims or, for technologies with IPR claims, to offer a royalty-free 
licence. Memo on best practice on IPR in IETF Technology from S Brader to Network Working Group 
(March 2005). http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt 
12
 Ken Krechmer, “Open Standards: A Call for Change” (2009) May IEEE Communications Magazine 
88.  For further discussion on the definition of openness see Concurrences N° 1-2010 I Tendances I 
Open Standards & Antitrust; and G Bird “The Business Benefits of Standards” Standards View (1998) 
6(2) 76-80. 
13
 Mark Lemley “Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations” (2002) 90 California 
Law Review 1889, 1902. 
14
 Ibid. 
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Open standards are adopted by public administrations with the aim of increasing 
interoperability and avoiding lock-in.  The intention is to achieve a more diverse and 
competitive market, enabling IT to interoperate and share information both inside 
and outside government departments and to achieve more economic efficiency in 
the delivery of IT.  Projects can be smaller and more manageable, and may be 
reused in other departments to avoid duplicating the commissioning of new solutions 
where one already exists.  Standardisation of data and document formats should 
give citizens and businesses a choice in the software they use when accessing 
government information services. 
The current report first gives a brief overview of the evolution of both the proprietary 
and open source suppliers of IT systems.  It then considers the main goal for open 
standards, which is to achieve greater interoperability, avoid lock-in, and lead to 
improved competition and hence innovation.  The presence of IPRs in standards is 
then introduced, for although the rationale for IPRs is to encourage innovation, the 
grant of exclusive rights can interfere with achieving interoperability.  Patents are 
particularly relevant as an important means of protecting the value of software but 
they may affect the successful operation of open standards.  They are also the 
apotheosis of the divergent business models of proprietary software and open 
source software suppliers.  The legal framework for the implementation of an open 
standards policy is reviewed, considering both competition law and public 
procurement regulations.  The literature on implementation options is then 
considered, looking at whether single standards should be mandated and whether 
an RF or FRAND policy should be adopted.  Finally there is a synopsis of costs and 
benefits drawing on previous case studies.  The report concludes that the evidence 
as reported in the literature supports open standards in principle, and identifies 
certain methods of implementation which require further consideration.  
1.1 Background of IT Suppliers 
When computers first entered the market from the 1950s, software was bundled with 
the hardware and it was not until the early 1980s that IBM moved to supplying 
software on an object code only policy.  By this time the cost of hardware had 
declined, while software became more valuable and in order to maintain revenue the 
source code was no longer disclosed.15  Proprietary software companies such as 
Microsoft, Oracle and Computer Associates expanded rapidly from nascent software 
developers in the 1970s to public quoted companies in the 1980s, specialising 
almost exclusively in computer software.  Alongside these companies were system 
suppliers such as IBM and ICL which provided both hardware and software 
                                            
15
 Martin Campbell-Kelly and Daniel Garcia-Swartz, “Pragmatism, not ideology: Historical 
perspectives on IBM‟s adoption of open-source software” (2009) 21 (3) Information Economics and 
Policy 229, 237-9.    
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solutions.  The norm at that time was for there to be little compatibility between the 
software systems of the various proprietary suppliers.      
The 1980s also saw the introduction of the open source software licence.  Open 
source software is defined by its collaborative development, accessibility of code and 
distribution models. In the academic software community that had pioneered the 
Internet, a belief grew that commercial imperatives were destroying the cooperative 
environment in which programmers worked. As software increased in complexity 
(and higher level programming made use of obfuscation techniques), decompilation 
and reimplementation of a programme from the binary object code (in which it is 
distributed and executed) became more difficult. In order to understand a 
programme fully, access to the source code (including symbolic labels and 
annotations) was indispensable. Richard Stallman left MIT in 1984, and pioneered 
an open approach to software development and distribution in the GNU Project, 
launched to develop a complete Unix-like operating system. In 1988, Stallman 
issued the first version of the General Public License (GPL) forcing derivatives of 
GNU software to keep their source code free from proprietary claims. In a radical 
spirit, which has been described as the constitution of the Free Software/Open 
Source movement, copyright law was used to subvert itself.16 
The GNU General Public License (GPL), as with all open source software, gives the 
user certain freedoms to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the 
software.  To make this meaningful users must have access to the source code.  It is 
these freedoms that give the software the prefix “free”.  Free software is a matter of 
liberty not price.17 The GPL is a copyleft licence in that the copyright holder “leaves” 
what would otherwise be exclusive rights available to others.  GPL v.2 contains a 
“liberty or death” clause making patent restrictions a breach of the licence and 
prohibiting further distribution of the software.18  GPL v.3 more directly addresses 
patents, granting licences of software patents in added source code for downstream 
users.19  Other open source software licences such as BSD, MIT and Apache are 
more “permissive”.  GPL v.2 is however the most widely used licence.20  The most 
popular open source licences have a built-in termination clause that prevents 
distribution of the software if it is associated with any obligations such as patent 
                                            
16
 Martin Kretschmer, “Software as Text and Machine”, introduction to special issue on Software-
related Inventions (2003) 1 Journal of Information, Law & Technology, 1-23. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2003_1/kretschmer/ 
17
 http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html 
18
 GPL v.2, section 7.  
19
 GPL v.3, section 11. 
20
 http://osrc.blackducksoftware.com/data/licenses/ 
GPL v.2 licence is used for roughly 40% of open source software projects and over 60% of all projects 
use GPL including the Linux project.   
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licences that would not permit redistribution.21  It does not mean that all software that 
reads on the OSS code must be RF but code that is licensed, for example under 
GPL, cannot be combined with an implementation of a FRAND standard without 
losing the ability to distribute the code.22      
Although incompatibility between proprietary software systems still exists there have 
been improvements in recent years.  There has also been “co-mingling” with many 
software users and developers using both proprietary and open source software.23   
Both proprietary and open source software can be compatible with open standards.  
It has been said that open source can benefit the implementation of open standards, 
as adoption of an open standard under an open source development model can 
sometimes drive or accelerate standard adoption,24 but standards do not have to use 
open source software to be open.   
                                            
21
 Mikko Valimaki and Ville Oksanen, “Patents on Compatibility Standards and Open Source – Do 
Patent Law Exceptions and Royalty Free Requirements Make Sense?” (Sept 2005) 2 (3) SCRIPT-ed. 
The latest versions of Apache license and Open Software License have similar clauses.  
22
 Jay Kesan, “The Fallacy of OSS Discrimination by FRAND Licensing: An Empirical Analysis” (2011) 
Illinois Public Law l Research Paper number 10-14.  http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1767083 
23
 Josh Lerner and Mark Schankerman, The Comingled Code: Open Source and Economic 
Development (MIT Press 2010). 
24
 Ibid. 
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2 The Relationship Between Open 
Standards, Competition and Innovation 
 
2.1 Interoperability 
Interoperability requires two or more programs to exchange and use information.  It 
does not require the programmes to use the same code or perform identical or 
similar functions but they must be able to exchange and use the exchanged 
information.  The exchange of information between programmes takes place through 
interfaces which can take various forms:  application programming interfaces (APIs), 
protocols, and data file formats.   
APIs disclose to other developers the standard means of requesting the platform to 
carry out tasks for their application.  Platforms provide APIs to encourage developers 
to write applications for their programme to gain network effects.  They are outward 
looking and do not reveal the details of how the task is accomplished.  Protocols 
define and specify rules for exchanging information such as how to format and 
identify messages.  Code compliant with the protocols enables IT systems to work 
together.  While APIs usually run on only one computer, protocols enable code to be 
written to work on two or more computers.  The code should comply with the protocol 
but will not normally be written in an identical way.  Data file formats specify how the 
data is encoded and stored in the files.  Some of these are made public but many 
data file formats do not even have written specifications.   
Each interface can exist in more than one form.  The original form can be in source 
code which is then compiled into machine code.  Many interfaces are then recorded 
as a specification in a word processed document.  The intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) that have been used to protect these various forms include copyright, trade 
secrets and patents.   
Standards in interfaces include standard document formats and protocol 
specifications.  These may include IPRs in the form of copyright and patents.  De 
facto standards are normally proprietary interfaces that have become standards due 
to the market share enjoyed by the proprietary software.  An example is Microsoft‟s 
“.doc” document format.  Open Standards by contrast are created by standard-
setting organisations (SSOs) which can be either formal standards bodies such as 
the International Standards Organisation (ISO) or consortia such as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) or World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).    
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It is widely believed that interoperability promotes socially desirable goals.25  
Intuitively it would seem that interoperability should create an expansion in use, 
enabling competition and encouraging innovation.26  The innovations thus stimulated 
would be more likely to be of the “follow on” type rather than “breakthroughs”.27  
While there is no systematic body of empirical evidence of a link between 
interoperability, and competition and innovation, the claim is often supported by 
illustrative examples.28   
It is certain that lack of interoperability causes expense and wastage.  The National 
Institute of Standards & Technology estimated that imperfect interoperability cost the 
US automotive supply chain at least $1 billion per year in 1999.29  Incompatibility 
between two versions of Dassault Systemes‟ CATIA 3D CAD software delayed the 
delivery of the A380 and resulted in a $6 billion loss for Airbus.30    
Perhaps the earliest and most notable impact of interoperability and open systems 
was the driving down of the quality adjusted price of the personal computer system 
when IBM, perhaps by accident, first introduced a personal computer using an open 
architecture.31  The industry moved from the closed business systems adopted 
                                            
25
 Pamela Samuelson, “Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?” (2008)  Berkeley Centre 
for Law & Technology 1.  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838 
26
 Commentators including Mark Lemley, “Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem” (1996) 
28 Connecticut Law Review, recognise the benefits of interoperability while others consider the 
position is more ambiguous, see e.g. Mario Gil-Moto, “Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: 
networks, interoperability and competition”, in Luca Rubini , “Microsoft on Trial” 344 at 359 et seq. 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010).          
27
 Follow on innovation is dynamic rather than static competition e.g. coming within the description of 
dynamic competition advocated by Gregory Sidak and David Teece, “Dynamic competition in antitrust 
law” (2009) 5(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 581-631,  594 et seq. 
28
 Urs Gasser and John Palfrey, “When and how interoperability drives innovation” (31 October 2007). 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_1.pdf 
29 Smita Brunnermeier and Sheila Martin, Research Triangle Institute, Center for Economics 
Research for NIST, “Interoperability Cost Analysis of the U.S. Automotive Supply Chain” Final Report, 
(March 1999). 
30
 Mel Duvall and Doug Bartholomew, “PLM: Boeing's Dream, Airbus' Nightmare”. 
http://www.tgstech.com/releases/BoeingsDream_AirbusNightmare.pdf    
31
  Joseph Farrell & Philip Weiser, “Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: 
Toward a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age” (2003) 17 Harvard Journal of 
Law and Technology 85 also Richard Langlois, “Modularity in Technology and Organization” (2002) 
49 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 19, 19.  IBM was vertically integrated based 
around its mainframe computers.  When it introduced personal computers it relied on Microsoft and 
Intel for key components including software and allowed them to license these to other computer 
makers.  The specialisation that followed saw rapid innovation in chips, peripheral devices such as 
modems and software.        
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initially by IBM and Apple to a modular structure which encouraged specialisation 
and innovation.  Innovation in components such as disk drives and modems as well 
as applications software proliferated.  As IBM and Apple‟s market share declined the 
average price of computers fell by 40 per cent in 1992 alone.32  
Interoperability has now been accepted as an essential virtue by most governments.  
The European Commission has accepted the benefits of interoperability in its 
competition law policy and policies for enterprise, industry and standardisation.33        
Network effects appear to magnify the benefits of interoperability.  Developers of 
platforms encourage the development of applications to work on the platform which 
attracts more customers to the platform.  This will encourage others to develop 
complementary products and generate an ever larger customer base – a virtuous 
cycle due to network effects.34  
2.2 Standards 
Standards are the accepted method of providing compatibility in traditional 
engineering, and in recent decades software standards have been developed to 
enable software interoperability.  Standards have well recognised benefits such as 
improving economic efficiency and promoting growth.35  Several studies have found 
that standards contribute nearly one percentage point per year in productivity and 
growth in some developed economies.36  The relationship between standards and 
innovation is more nuanced.  Standards can aid innovation by reducing time to 
market and codifying and disseminating the state of the art technology.37  It appears 
that standards can increase product variety by increasing the number of value-added 
combinations and this is seen as more valuable than their impact on procurement or 
                                            
32
 David Angel and James Engstrom, “Manufacturing Systems and Technological Change: The U.S. 
Personal Computer Industry”, (1995) 71 Economic Geography 79, 81.  IBM and Apple‟s market share 
fell from 52% to 21% between 1984 and 1992 to firms such as Compaq and low-cost system 
assemblers such as Dell who took advantage of the modularisation of the personal computer market.     
33
 For example the ISA Interoperability Solutions for European Public Administration programme and 
decision in merger cases including Case COMP/M.5669, Cisco Systems, Inc. And Tandberg ASA., 
[2010] OJ L-2985. 
34
 Pamela Samuelson (n 25) 7.   
35
 Marcus Glader, “Open Standards: Public Policy Aspects and Competition Law Requirements”  
(2010) 6(3)  European Competition Journal  611–643; The Economics of Standardization: An Update, 
G.M.P. Swann, Report for the UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) by Innovative 
Economics Ltd, 2010 and Mark Lemley (n 13) 1889.     
36
 Studies reported in Swann ibid, 4-6.  
37
 Swann ibid, 9 -12; Knut Blind, “Standardisation: A Catalyst for Innovation” (August 2009) Inaugural 
Address, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus Universiteit. 
http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/17558/EIA-2009-039-LIS.pdf 
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production costs.  There is also a perception that standards do not level the playing 
field but may favour dominant firms.38  Standards play an important role in network 
industries as they help the adoption of new technologies by enabling forward and 
backward compatibility.39 There are concerns however that “over-standardisation” 
can restrict product differentiation and can decrease competition and innovation.40 
The level of constraint appears to vary with the nature of the standard and its user.  
There may be more constraint with old standards, associated with lock-in to legacy 
systems, rather than with new standards, however early standardisation may 
constrain innovation.41  Some standards mainly codify knowledge and are 
informative and more likely to have a direct benefit to innovation than constraining 
standards concerned with such matters as health and safety.  The perception of the 
user also varies, with more innovative users taking knowledge from the standard and 
then pushing the boundaries of innovation so that innovation is not prevented.42  
Standards in software must cope with lock-in, network effects and arguably a less 
than optimal IPR regime but overall can offer advantages from improved 
interoperability.                      
2.3 Lock-in 
A lack of interoperability can result in users who have bought a platform or software 
being unable to join a network or to move their data and being “locked in”.43 There 
are two aspects to this lock-in: firstly “network” lock-in where, if they have not chosen 
the emergent market standard, users are faced with the additional costs of changing 
to the market standard, and secondly “vendor” lock-in which may cause users to lose 
the use of their expensively acquired data.  Vendor lock-in is caused by 
incompatibility between the user‟s existing data and alternative forms of software, 
and is differentiated by the scale of switching costs per user and unquantifiable 
factors such as legacy issues and risk of undetected errors in data.  User lock-in has 
                                            
38
 Knut Blind, Stephen Gauch and Richard Hawkins, “How stakeholders view the impact of 
international ICT standards” (2010) 34 Telecommunications Policy 162-174. 
39
 Blind (n 37) 30.   
40
 Glader (n 35) 615. 
41
 “The Empirical Economics of Standards”, (June 2005) DTI Economics Paper 12, Department of 
Trade and Industry. www.bis.gov.uk/files/file9655.pdf 
42
 Swann (n 35) referring to Peter Swann and RJ Lambert, “Why do Standards Enable and Constrain 
Innovation?” unpublished paper, Nottingham University Business School April (2010). 
43
 Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, Information Rules - a strategic guide to the network economy 
(Harvard Business School Press, Harvard, 1998) 107.  Björn Lundell describes various types of lock-
in in “Why do we need Open Standards?”,  M Orviska and K Jakobs (Eds) Proceedings 17
th
 EURAS 
2012 Annual Standardisation Conference „Standards and Innovation‟ The EURAS Board Series, 
Aachen 227-240. 
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existed for many decades when capital equipment was only physically compatible 
with the original vendor‟s equipment.  This branch of lock-in can now be caused by 
lack of interoperability between computer programs.   
Lock-in can be caused by a variety of switching costs:  damages due to contractual 
commitments, the cost of replacement equipment, loyalty programmes, search costs, 
transaction costs and uncertainty about alternative suppliers, retraining and 
compatibility.44  The costs of switching from one proprietary software program to 
another can include new hardware, software customisation, training and 
implementation.  Training alone is significant, and business processes may have to 
be changed to meet the needs of the new software.  Existing data may have to be 
converted with the risk that it is corrupted or even lost in the process. An industry 
estimate is that all of these costs are about eleven times the cost of the software 
itself.45  
Some suppliers have adopted a more open approach to encourage interoperability, 
but many still have interfaces that are strongly protected by IPRs, secrecy and 
constant changes or upgrades.  Standards are one approach to preventing lock-in by 
providing compatibility, but the role of IPRs in interfaces and the consequent 
standards requires careful attention.    
2.4 Intellectual Property Rights in Interfaces 
Proprietary software companies protect their software by copyright, trade secrets 
and patents.  These IPRs prevent the code or function being copied, and give the 
company control over whether other suppliers can design products which are 
compatible with and interoperate with each other.  Depending on their business 
strategy, firms may be open and non-proprietary with interface information, as some 
may benefit from network effects for their systems.  Developers of platforms have an 
incentive to allow other developers to create applications to work on their platforms 
but may not be open to potential rival platforms.46  Others will have a proprietary 
closed approach.  The plan can change over time and an interface is always 
                                            
44
 Types of lock-in and switching costs are suggested by Shapiro and Varian and also by Paul 
Klemperer “Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to 
Industrial Organizations, Macroeconomics, and International Trade, (1995) 62 (4) Review of 
Economic Studies 515-539. 
45
 Hal Varian, Economics of Information Technology (2003) revision of Raffaele Mattioli Lecture, 
University, Milano, Italy,  15-16 November 2001 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/mattioli/mattioli.html; also Ian Larkin “Bargain-then-
Ripoffs: Innovation, Pricing and Lock-in in Enterprise Software” Academy of Management Annual 
Meeting Proceedings. 2008: 1-6 
46
 Apple‟s strategy is normally for a closed proprietary system although it encourages applications to 
be written for its platform.  Urs Gasser and John Palfrey “DRM-protected Music Interoperability and 
eInnovation” (November 2007) Berkman Publication Series. http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop 
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vulnerable and could change and become unavailable unless it is adopted as a 
standard.47 
The main purpose of software standards is to increase interoperability.  Software 
interoperability is achieved through software interfaces, particularly the data formats 
but also APIs and protocols.  Proprietary software interfaces are not readily available 
(because they are not published or even properly recorded) and are often protected 
by IPRs.  Adopting standards for the interfaces helps to record and publish the 
interfaces but the adoption of standards incorporating IPRs raises several issues as 
to how the demands of both interests can be met.  The nature and justification for 
IPRs will be considered next.  
2.5 Is there Copyright in Software Interfaces? 
Copyright endows the creator with exclusive rights over its original creations for a 
period of time.  This is done to raise the supply of works closer to a socially desirable 
level.  Copyright is not unconditional but there must be trade-offs with other 
objectives and values.  The law attempts to strike a balance between protecting the 
creator and the costs imposed on other creators, such as the cost of obtaining 
permission to use copyright protected work.48 Legal exceptions have arisen for these 
socially desirable purposes, such as to enable interoperability.    
The Software Directive gave copyright protection to computer programs, but 
interfaces are considered an exception.49  The status and limits of the exception 
have not yet been finally established but a recent judgement in the English Courts 
considered that interfaces were not copyright protected.50  The case was referred to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a determination of several points, including 
the copyright status of data formats.  The Advocate General‟s opinion did not answer 
this particular question directly but he did say that the Directive “does not exclude 
interfaces from copyright protection”, merely the ideas and principles underlying the 
interface.51  The ECJ ruled that as the format of data files is used to exploit certain 
                                            
47
 For example when Microsoft first entered the work-group server operating systems market it 
disclosed interface information to enter, catch up and then dominate that market.  It then introduced 
new software, Windows 2000, and did not disclose equivalent information.  Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft, Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 relating to proceedings under Art 82 EC, para.780. 
48
 Christian Handke, “The Economics of Copyright and Digitisation” (2010) (03) UK Strategic Advisory 
Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP). 
49
 Council Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs (hereinafter “Software 
Directive” or “Directive” as case requires) [2009] OJ  L111/16.  See first paragraphs of section 2.1 for 
an explanation of what constitutes an interface.    
50
 SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd EWHC 1829 (Ch) [2010].  
51
 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd [2011] ECR I -1, Opinion of AG Bot.   
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functions they do not constitute a form of expression and, as such, are not protected 
by copyright.52  So while the source code and machine code of interfaces may not 
per se be outside the protection of copyright, there are certain aspects, such as 
specifications and protocols (the aspects relevant to standards) which are not 
expressions but ideas and principles and thus not copyright protected.  When 
interpreting the Software Directive the ECJ must take account of TRIPS which gives 
copyright protection to expressions but not to “ideas, procedures, methods of 
operation or mathematical concepts as such” (emphasis added).  Interfaces have 
been interpreted as methods of operation53 and hence not copyright protected.   
Copyright is a weak protection intended for literary and artistic expression that is 
normally exposed to numerous competing expressions.  Unlike a work of art or the 
words of a book, the copyright protected material in software is not normally visible 
or readable.  The supplier usually only distributes the program in machine code and 
not in human readable source code.54  This gives a much stronger protection than is 
normally associated with copyright protection and creates a unique form of IPR.55  
Not only is the source code not distributed but the supplier may also claim to protect 
it as a trade secret.  This means that while the interface may not be copyright 
protected it is inaccessible, and thus interoperability is hindered.    
The Software Directive attempts to address this by permitting certain acts that would 
normally contravene copyright.  One such act is to decompile machine code to re-
create a higher level, human readable language.  This form of reverse engineering is 
only permitted to obtain information for the purpose of interoperability.  Subject to 
such restrictions in the Directive, reverse engineering is permitted even though the 
supplier claims trade secrets in the source code.  Reverse engineering is common 
and often an effective means of achieving compatibility.  While it is not a complete 
remedy, as software systems are complex and interfaces can change when new 
versions are released, it is difficult to see how a supplier could justify royalty payment 
on interfaces based on trade secrets when there is a lawful way to discover the 
information.56  Indeed it has been found that copyright is rarely claimed in 
standards.57                   
                                            
52
 Case C-406/10 SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd [2012] Judgement of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) 2 May 2012. 
53
 Sega Enterprises, Ltd v Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9
th
 Cir. 1992). 
54
 This is not the case for open source software where the source code is normally available. 
55
 Decompilation can only be used to access interface information so “in essence, the Council made 
copyright law into a super-strong trade secrecy law as to every aspect of program internals – except 
interfaces” Pamela Samuelson (n 25) 21 -22.  
56
 In Microsoft, Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission 5 C.M.L.R. 11 [2007] neither the Commission 
nor the ECJ were impressed by the trade secret argument as the protection afforded to trade secrets 
can be more limited than copyright or patent protections, and they exist as a result of a unilateral 
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In 1992 the decision in Sega Enterprises, Ltd v Accolade, Inc.58 reined-in copyright 
and trade secret protection of interfaces in the USA.  Interfaces were spoken of as 
“functional requirements for achieving compatibility with other programmes”59 and so 
excluded from copyright protection.  Copying code when reverse engineering for the 
purpose of extracting interface information for interoperability amounted to fair use 
and did not infringe copyright.60 To enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or 
functional principle underlying a work, the creator must meet the more stringent test 
required for patent protection.61  Following Sega, developers are unable to protect 
interfaces in the USA by copyright.  The case also approved decompilation of code 
to extract interface information, and so put trade secrets at risk.  This approach was 
followed in the recent decision in the US District Court in the dispute between 
Google and Oracle.  The Java APIs were held not to be copyrightable, as provided 
the new code is different from the original, when there is only one way to express an 
idea or function everyone is free to do so (although this was expressly limited to the 
facts of the case).62   
Since Sega there has been an increase in patent applications in the USA for 
software interfaces,63 as although being first to market may be an incentive to 
innovate, particularly where there are switching costs, without some form of 
protection software is by its nature easy to copy, either by outright pirating or by 
copying the code into new products, which eliminates the first mover benefit. 
                                                                                                                                       
business decision dependant on its facts and the interests at stake.  Here the value of the secret was 
not its innovative nature but the fact that it belonged to a dominant undertaking.  See also Pamela 
Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer “The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering”, (2002) Vol. 
111, The Yale Law Journal, 1575 at 1620, if reverse engineering is both lawful and feasible, trade 
secrecy protection for platform APIs is vulnerable. 
57
 Knut Blind and others, “Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights” 
(OJEU S136 of 18/07/2009) Final Report, 11. 
58
 977 F.2d 1510 (9
th
 Cir. 1992). 
59
 Ibid, at 1525-26. 
60
 Ibid,  1527-28. 
61
 Ibid,  1525. 
62
 Oracle America, Inc. v Google Inc. US District Court (31 May 2012, C10-03561 WHA) . 
63
 Pamela Samuelson (n 25) 13 – there may be many thousands of patents on interfaces;  Lerner J, 
and Zhu F, “What is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from Lotus v Borland” (2005) 
NBER Working Paper 11168 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11168 provides empirical evidence of a 
surge in patenting of software dating from the mid-1990s. 
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2.6 Can the Purpose and Benefits of Patents be Reconciled with 
Standards?    
The rationale for patents is to encourage innovation by excluding others.  This would 
appear to be at odds with the aims of standards which enable interoperability and 
competition to encourage innovation.  This sub-section explores this conflict and the 
professed link between patents and innovation identified in the literature, and starts 
with a brief overview of the law and growth in software patents.      
Patents protect ideas and function, unlike copyright which just protects the 
expression of those ideas.  Software, along with mathematical and business 
methods, is not patentable “as such” under the European Patent Convention and the 
Patents Act 1977.  To be patentable it has to have a “technical contribution” which is 
new and non-obvious, and which is generally referred to as a computer implemented 
invention.64  The USPTO has required a useful, concrete and tangible result65 even if 
only on the computer screen, but with no “as such” statutory exclusion the 
“enablement” requirement for software inventions has been eliminated.  Software 
patents now make up 15% of all patents granted in the USA, where about 20,000 
software patents are granted each year.66  The propensity to apply for software 
patents increased by 16% per annum in the 20 years to 1996 while spending on 
R&D grew by only 4.4%.  The reason for the low relative growth in R&D spending is 
not clear and it may be due to R&D being more efficient and taking place in 
promising and expanding fields rather than a fall in innovation.67   
The literature gives a stated justification for patent protection as the desire to stop 
others appropriating the work of an innovator, as this would prevent the innovator 
recouping a return on his R&D costs.68  The use of patents to stop others 
                                            
64
 The UKIPO adopted a four-step test first applied in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd, Macrossan‟s 
Patent Application EWCA Civ [2006] 1371.   The proposed patent directive was intended to provide 
that interfaces essential to interoperability are “ideas” or “principles” should be unpatentable. The 
proposed Art 6a “MS shall ensure that wherever the use of a patented technique is needed for the 
sole purpose of ensuring conversion of the conventions used in two different computer systems or 
networks so as to allow communication and exchange of data content between them, such use is not 
considered to be patent infringement.”  See Robert Bray “The European Union “Software Patents 
Directive: What is it? Where is it? Where are we now?”  (2005) 11 Duke Law & Technology Review 28 
but there may be some difficulty justifying an interoperability exception under TRIPS because normal 
exploitation of patents includes licensing them, Samuelson (n 25) 26. 
65
 In re Alappa (33 F. 3d 1526, (1994). 
66
 James Bessen and Robert Hunt, “An Empirical Look at Software Patents” (2007) 16 (1) Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy, 157-189, 158-160. 
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 Ibid. 173.  
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 Kenneth Dam, “Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software” 
(1995) 24 Journal of Legal Studies  321. 
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appropriating innovations in software has three potential economic consequences - 
monopolies, rent seeking and favouring current over future innovation.  The right to 
try to exclude others may result in market power which is considered a social cost 
that is necessary to stimulate innovation and provide a return on R&D expenditures.  
Debatably, although patents rarely give monopolies in any economic market and 
patent doctrines can avoid unnecessary rent seeking69, there is an acknowledged 
impact on competition caused by a lack of interoperability and lock-in in software 
markets.70  There can also be a lack of choice in patents in standards where a 
distinction is drawn between patents in similarity standards and patents in 
compatibility standards as they have a different economic impact.   FRAND rules are 
appropriate for similarity standards where the user can choose whether to take 
advantage of the patented technology.  Where compatibility standards define 
interfaces, all who wish to use the system must pay for the patent without any 
decision on their part about the value of the patent to them.  This is seen as an 
unplanned expansion of the patent system that greatly impacts the rights of others 
and which should be recognised and addressed.71   
The desire to generate a stream of innovation over time means that it can be 
counterproductive to raise the level of protection too high.  Inventors and creators 
want to benefit from previous works.  While failure to give any protection might be a 
disincentive to R&D, the pace of technological change and progress could be slowed 
if the appropriate balance is not achieved.72  The software sector is one where 
innovation tends to be cumulative and therefore the impact of patents can be 
negative for innovation.  While patents reduce the prospects of imitation in a static 
world, software development is dynamic and sequential and patent protection may 
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 Ibid, 337 – economic rent is in one sense the incentive accorded to the innovator by IPR which 
should not be excessive.  Copyright does not exclude independently created works and various 
patent doctrines reduce the extent of any economic rent for most technologies and see also Kenneth 
Dam, “The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, (1995) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 247, 253. 
70
 In Microsoft v Commission Microsoft enjoyed a dominant (quasi-monopoly) on the pc operating 
systems market and used the lack of interoperability to leverage an increasing market share of the 
work group server operating system market.  The impact of lack of interoperability was also 
recognised in merger cases such as Intel and McAfee, COMP/M.5984 Intel Corporation and McAfee, 
Inc., [2011] OJ L.  Copyright doctrine does not give protection to interfaces but there appears to be a 
trend to seek patent protection of interfaces.  
71
 Ken Krechmer (n 12) 90-91. 
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 William Landes and Richard Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 (1989) Journal of 
Legal Studies 325 at 332 “From an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an author from whom a 
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inhibit complementary innovation.73  This may explain why, as patent protection of 
software became accepted,74 firms in the computer and electronics hardware 
industries, which obtained the most software patents, actually reduced their R&D 
spend relative to sales.75 Most software patents in the USA were obtained by 
manufacturing firms, especially in the electronics and machinery industries (which 
include computers), with only 5% in the hands of software publishers and other 
software service firms, excluding IBM which accounted for an additional 2%.  Patents 
tend to benefit the larger firms more as they have the resources to apply for, 
maintain and defend patents.  Smaller firms are ambiguous about the advantages of 
patents.  Although some find patents are strategically important and can help secure 
finance76 they can be deterred because of expense and the fear of patent disputes 
with wealthier firms.77 There has been an increase in patenting by large firms such 
as Adobe, Microsoft and Oracle, while most software firms hold no patents.78  
Although large firms may engage in patent portfolio races it has been concluded that 
software patentability has “no particular positive impact on software innovation per 
se”.79   
                                            
73
 James Bessen and Eric Maskin, “Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation”  (2009) (4) RAND 
Journal of Economics, Winter, 611-635 – explain “sequential,” as successive invention builds on the 
preceding one eg Microsoft‟s Excel built on Lotus, and “complementary,” means each potential 
innovator takes a different research line which increases the overall probability that a particular goal is 
reached within a given time e.g the many different approaches taken to voice-recognition software 
hastened the availability of commercially viable packages. They consider that “when innovation is 
sequential and complementary, standard conclusions about patents and imitation may get turned on 
their heads. Imitation becomes a spur to innovation, whereas strong patents become an impediment.” 
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 The line of cases following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Diamond v Diehr (450 US 
175) 1981. 
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 James Bessen and Eric Maskin (n 73) 
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 Andrés Guadamuz González, “The software patent debate” (2006) 1 (3) Journal of Intellectual 
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European Commission Report.   
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Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17773. 
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Patents granted on technologies that were already known or were obvious means 
the resulting patents cause social costs without offsetting benefits.80  A serious 
criticism of software patents is not the concept but its “abysmal implementation.”81 
Particularly in the USA, patents are being granted for processes and ideas that are 
obvious and not inventive.82  This problem is recognised and there have been calls 
to reinvigorate the non-obviousness standard for obtaining patent protection for 
software interfaces.83  The present software environment is said to be “polluted by 
bad software patents” which have a particular effect on open source developers who 
lack the resources to challenge a patent‟s validity or defend themselves against 
allegations of infringement.84 Patents are granted on a national basis and there is 
variance in the legal position.  It cannot be certain that the problems at the USPTO 
have affected Europe and the UK patent practice but criticism exists of European 
patents, and examples that are not innovative and where prior art exists have been 
identified.85  The patent system may be national, but standards in software interfaces 
tend to be international, and policy on standards in the UK cannot assume that the 
UK is isolated from these problems.  
The acknowledged drawbacks to software patents for interfaces, including 
insufficient rigour in the standard for non-obviousness and lack of adequate cost 
effective post grant review,86 has made organisations such as OASIS and W3C 
sufficiently wary of patents to adopt RF policies to avoid patent hold ups.87   
In addition to incentivising innovation, patents are granted in return for early 
publication of the invention.  Software patents do not however have to disclose the 
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 Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, “Probabilistic Patents” (2005) 19 (2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives,  Spring,  75-98 – they note that roughly half of all litigated patents (less than 1% of all 
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 A Jaffe and J Lerner, “Innovation and its discontents” (2004)  202 referred to by Gonzalez (n 76) 
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to the existence of prior art; Samuelson (n 25). 
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 Samuelson (n 25) 28-29; David Evans and Anne Layne-Farrar “Software Patents and Open 
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 Samuelson (n 25) 29. 
87
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source code or object code or even detailed descriptions of the patented program.88  
As patents can be narrower than the interface they do not necessarily require the 
revelation of all the “trade secrets” necessary for full compatibility.  Patent protection 
can be available in addition to trade secret protection, but as the patentable element 
of software is often not visible, other than by reverse engineering, trade secrecy is an 
alternative to patenting.  As patenting requires some disclosure it is feared that 
adverse selection may occur where more innovative ideas are kept secret and only 
the obvious ideas are there for all to see.89   
In the Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements,90 firms were categorised by their use 
and ownership of patents which would affect their interests in the outcome of the 
standard setting process.91  There were the upstream-only companies that only 
develop and market IPR, and their incentive is to maximise royalties.  There are the 
downstream-only companies which make or supply services based on IPR owned by 
others and which want to minimise royalties.  The third group is vertically integrated 
companies which both own IPR and make goods or supply services and have mixed 
incentives.  There is a concern that RF standards could foreclose the business for 
the upstream-only firms.  This business model of non-practicing entities (NPEs) 
includes universities and research centres and patent “trolls”.92   
NPEs acquire patents in order to license them to others, although some also conduct 
research themselves.  NPEs are very active in software patents (although not 
specifically standards) as software patents can be vague.  NPEs are said to account 
for about 41% of patent litigation involving software patents.93  The loss to 
defendants as a result of this litigation has been assessed at half a trillion dollars 
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 James Bessen and Robert Hunt (n 66); Courts in the USA have accepted high-level functional 
descriptions.  
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while the benefit to the original patent inventor was only 2 percent of that amount.94  
The threat of this litigation, which for software is often for an inadvertent 
infringement, can be a disincentive to innovate.95  There is concern that the incentive 
flow to small inventors does not offset the very much larger disincentive imposed on 
technology firms. This shortfall is considered a social cost of NPEs. 
The aim of preventing imitation is the traditional patent motive, but there is evidence 
of other strategic motives.  These include blocking competitors by patenting in 
adjoining fields with no intention of exploiting the patent, and for the purpose of 
exchanging and cross licensing.96   “Patent thickets” are cited as a disadvantage of 
patenting of software as they may require complex cross-licensing to allow 
newcomers to enter the market, but are said not to effect research and development 
spending.97   
2.7 Patents and Standards 
Patents in standards are said to aid investment in and diffusion of the standard as 
well as encouraging patents to be committed to a standard.98  Further, while patents 
may not be well suited to software inventions, there is said to presently be 
insufficient empirical evidence that patents are such a major impediment to 
interoperability that the exclusion of interfaces from patent protection is justified.99  
There are however several examples of established firms with strong market 
positions taking patents on interfaces, possibly with the aim of controlling the 
development of competing and complementary products.100 Patents are considered 
most threatening to competition when they are held by established firms with market 
power which may use them to leverage their dominant position in one market into an 
adjacent market.101 
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The exclusionary power of patents in interfaces is considered strong102 as 
infringements are easier to detect than other software patent infringements and as 
patents protect the function and not just the way the code is written, thus potentially 
making it impossible to work around the patent.103  In the absence of an SSO 
imposing a FRAND or RF obligation, firms can often charge higher royalty rates for 
licensing interface patents than other patents, regardless of the intrinsic degree of 
innovation.104  This practice known as “patent hold up” should be alleviated where 
the SSO successfully adopts a FRAND or RF policy.105   
Patent ambushes are another potential problem in standards where members of 
SSOs are deceptive and only assert their patents after the standard is set.  A similar 
risk comes from non-members who subsequently assert patents without any FRAND 
obligation.  These incidences are not common but significant when they do occur.   
Standards in some parts of the ICT industry have also suffered from royalty stacking 
where multiple royalties impose a burden that is inefficient or even obstructive as 
individual rights holders do not take account of the negative effect on downstream 
sales.  Again it is argued that excessive cumulative royalties are uncommon and 
whether royalties are passed downstream to end customers depends on a number of 
market factors.106      
A further concern is that the royalty that can be imposed may be due to the nature of 
the standard rather than the value in the IPR.  The IPR holder may try to profit from 
the standard‟s strategic position and extract excessive rents.107     
Participants in the process of adopting a new interface standard tend to accept the 
IPR of others if its own IPR is also accepted.  Although the participants benefit, this 
is unfair to those who do not participate and to the end user who ultimately bears the 
cost.108       
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Patents may not be the only IPR in interfaces, but patents appear more likely to 
attract licence fees than other IPRs.  Following the Microsoft case and the settlement 
in 2009, Microsoft still continued to charge royalties for its interface patents but not 
for non-patented interface information.109  Microsoft‟s willingness to license protocols 
including to SAMBA on GPL-friendly terms may not have occurred but for the 
Commission‟s enforcement action.110        
2.8 How do SSOs Approach IPR? 
While the terms adopted by SSOs vary, the majority require or encourage members 
to disclose essential patents, and sometimes all IPRs of which they are aware.  It is 
not usually required for participants to disclose pending patents or to conduct 
searches.  Some SSOs do not require disclosure provided the patent holder is willing 
to commit to licence on FRAND or RF terms.  An empirical study found that 
mandating RF licensing is negatively associated with a disclosure requirement, but 
that FRAND is strongly associated with such a requirement.111  
The W3C requires patents necessary for interoperability to be licensed RF, although 
there is a procedure for getting an exclusion from RF.112  OASIS adopted RF 
licensing options but also allows for some licensing of patented technologies for 
standards on RAND terms.  Apparently the RF terms have proved more popular and 
the overwhelming majority have adopted RF policies for application and web 
services approved by OASIS.113  
Patents remain enforceable even where an RF policy for interface patents is 
adopted, but it is thought that this policy reduces their leverage and economic value.  
This will dampen incentives to acquire patents.  Even so, some open source 
developers do not agree with W3C and similar RF policies as the license may still 
include restrictions that are not acceptable to some members of the open source 
community.114 
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When a sample of SSOs policies was reviewed in 2002,115 the majority adopted 
standards which included IPRs, but two SSOs prohibited the continued ownership of 
any IPRs adopted by a standard, and one required members to give up patent rights.  
The policy of at least one of those SSOs, the ISO, has changed and members can 
now continue to own patents with a policy of disclosure and licence of patents on RF 
or RAND terms.116  Four SSOs permitted members to own the patents but only if 
they licensed them RF.117  A further survey recorded in 2005 found a majority of 
SSOs (63%) used RAND in the patent licensing rules and only 9% used RF rules.118 
More recently there are signs of a shift towards RF licensing as Google and web 
standards bring competitive pressure to adopt RF licensing models.119 
One thing most SSOs have in common is that while they may require patents to be 
licensed on FRAND terms, the negotiations on converting that principle into actual 
figures and words must take place between the parties.  The 2005 survey found that 
only 9% of organisations have a dispute resolution mechanism.  Most SSOs are not 
involved in agreeing what may constitute a reasonable fee or other terms.120  
2.9 Is There a Failure in the Market due to IPRs in Standards? 
Most commentators agree that there should be a market for standards with minimal 
government interference.  IPRs are however by their nature interference, as they 
give exclusive rights of self-interest in return for benefits that give public economic 
welfare in the form of incentives to innovate and publication of past innovations.  
IPRs are granted in the expectation that the deadweight loss caused by the grant of 
exclusivity is lower than the value of increased inventiveness that follows. 
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Market failures are not limited to actual failures of markets to appear, but also occur 
when markets fail to align private and social economic welfare and arguably socio-
economic goals.121     
Lerner and Schankerman acknowledge that there are shortcomings in both patent 
policy and the functioning of SSOs with externalities due to network effects and a 
lack of information about the market, particularly open source software.  They do not 
however consider that governments should exploit their purchasing power to 
compensate for distortions, and change the nature of the market.  They propose that 
market failure in the form of abuse of network dominance should be addressed by 
competition law.122  A lack of interoperability, lock-in and high switching costs do not 
always justify intervention, even when the results are strong network effects.  
Innovation can still happen in other ways, such as the “gale of creative destruction” 
or the “killer app” rather than evolution.123   
However the IPR regime for software, which is arguably not fit for purpose, gives an 
additional barrier to entry by giving monopoly rights that may not efficiently 
incentivise innovation.  For competition law to intervene there must be both 
dominance and evidence of abuse, and the remedy invariably gives only a slow ex-
post remedy. But due to lack of interoperability and the resulting lock-in and high 
switching costs there can be little competition in some software markets even where 
there is no obvious monopoly.124  Lack of interoperability means the market is not 
contestable, but as there is no single dominant supplier a normal remedy under 
competition law is unavailable.  
In some software markets there appears to be a dominant supplier.  It is claimed that 
the desktop PCs of Europe‟s governments are completely locked in to a single 
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proprietary software vendor due to high switching costs.125  The market is tipped 
“towards a certain technology or standard, not necessarily the one offering the 
highest user benefits, creating a monopoly position for the seller of that 
technology.”126 
Vendor lock-in and high switching costs are said to give a first-mover advantage 
leading to higher prices and entry barriers for suppliers of new software products.   
“In software markets, the implication is not necessarily that production by a single 
firm is the most efficient outcome.  The resulting high monopoly price creates a 
deadweight loss, that is, a loss in welfare that occurs when demand is reduced due 
to a mark-up in the price.”127  By “welfare”, economists mean consumer and 
producer surplus.128 
The dependence on a single IT vendor has been described as “a waste of public 
money that public bodies can no longer afford”,129 a waste not only of public money 
but also of the private money of the citizen who has to use a specific product (rather 
than any product compliant with an applicable standard), to use a public service.  
Market failure also occurs due to asymmetric information.  IT systems are sufficiently 
complex that, while the producer may have an advanced understanding of the 
system, the user does not, until it is too late. There are several examples in the UK 
of software system procurement that have gone badly wrong.  The notorious 
FiReControl Project was intended to introduce a new IT system linking nine purpose-
built regional centres.  It was terminated after seven years at a cost of £469 million, 
with no IT system delivered and eight of the nine new regional control centres 
remaining empty and costly to maintain.130  Although management failings in that 
project went beyond the IT system, less complex IT projects such as the attempt to 
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improve shared service centres have also failed to achieve the expected cost 
savings in part due to imperfect information about complex software and costs.  The 
projects indicate an imperfect market and are expensive for the taxpayer, underlining 
the need for government to improve all aspects of IT procurement, including taking 
steps to improve interoperability. 
Interim Conclusion 
The law has recognised that software interfaces should be exempted from copyright 
protection.  The law on software patents has developed separately and there is no 
exemption for interfaces.  There is evidence that the concept and implementation of 
software patents is flawed, does not incentivise innovation and could restrict the 
operation of standards and interoperability.  This raises the question of whether there 
is any economic justification in encouraging patent protection of interfaces and 
whether there is a failure of the market which has not been corrected by the SSOs‟ 
adoption of FRAND policies.  Further research is required before this question can 
be resolved. This research could investigate the liberalisation of interface 
information, exempting interfaces from patent protection, and could consider whether 
conventional competition rules can adequately regulate markets characterised by a 
lack of interoperability and lock-in.  In any event the role of government when acting 
as a procurer of software should not primarily be one of market intervention.   
Governments should however be aware that arguments suggesting that royalties on 
standards are essential to reward and encourage innovation are not clear cut and 
the balance of interests is in fact far more nuanced.   
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3 Regulatory Implications of Mandating 
open Standards Under EU 
Competition and Procurement Law 
3.1 Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements 
Setting of standards creates an exclusive market position which can easily be 
abused.  The co-operation between competitors and the setting of detailed 
specifications can exclude competing technologies.131  For this reason the behaviour 
of firms participating in standard setting can infringe Art 101 and 102, competition 
law provisions of the TFEU.     
The benefits of standards are well recognised as improving economic efficiency and 
promoting growth132 and for this reason are encouraged despite the possible 
restriction on competition.  For a standard to be beneficial, it must not only have 
technical merit, but  the rules, process and procedures of adoption on which it is 
available for implementation must also be sound and in particular must not infringe 
competition law.  The Commission has issued guidance in the form of the 
“Guidelines on Horizontal Agreements” to assist SSOs and other interested parties in 
shaping the standard setting process, to comply with European competition law.133   
The Guidelines cover all standards, but this document is concerned with 
standardisation agreements covering technical specifications in markets where 
compatibility and interoperability with other products or systems is essential.134 
In the past decade the level of essential IPRs in standards has increased.135  The 
Commission has dealt with some high profile disputes including Rambus, a “patent 
ambush” case, where Rambus did not reveal an essential patent until the industry 
was locked-in.136 It has been said that attention has shifted in recent years from 
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concerns about collusion between participants, where the aim is to exclude 
competitors, to focus on preventing “hold up” problems.  This change of emphasis is 
a result of the increase in the incidence of patents in standards.137       
The Guidelines acknowledge that standardisation agreements may encourage new 
and improved products, increase competition, reduce costs and ensure 
interoperability.138  In specific circumstances however standard setting can 
potentially reduce competition by restricting price competition, foreclosing 
technologies and discrimination by preventing access to the standard for example by 
using IPRs to “hold-up” users after the standard has been adopted.139  The 
Guidelines recognise that SSOs have different rules and procedures, but also 
provide a limited “safe harbour” for SSOs meeting certain criteria based on 
unrestricted but non compulsory participation, a transparent procedure and access 
on FRAND terms.140  FRAND can also cover RF licensing.141  It is thought that SSOs 
with an RF standards policy would meet the safe harbour requirements without 
having to disclose IPRs.142 Variation from these terms does not necessarily 
invalidate the standard but the rules and procedures must satisfy an effects-based 
assessment, contain only essential restrictions, and display efficiency gains which 
are passed on to customers.  Efficiency gains include technical interoperability and 
compatibility as they often encourage competition and prevent lock-in.143  
When implementing open standards a government will normally be interested in the 
Guidelines as a public procurer and user of standards rather than as a participant.  
This report considers the role of government from that perspective, as a third party or 
consumer,144 not as a participant in the standard setting process.   If there is any 
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collaboration with a participant in the standard-setting procedure then the position 
needs to be reassessed as a government could then be subject to the rules as a 
participant.        
The main concern for a government adopting open standards is that the standard will 
be available in the future to maintain existing IT services and for future procurement.  
The government does not want to be locked-in to a standard which then becomes 
unavailable because the rules and procedures on which it was adopted were 
unlawful or unenforceable.   
The aim of competition law and the Guidelines is to avoid competition being distorted 
by the setting of standards.  To avoid collusion a transparent process must give 
unrestricted rights for all competitors to be involved, non-discriminatory allocation of 
voting rights and objective criteria for selecting the technology.145  Of more direct 
interest to a government adopting open standards is the requirement that 
participants are required to make good faith disclosure of any IPRs so that an 
informed decision can be made on whether to include the technology in the 
standard.  Perhaps of most importance though is the requirement in the Guidelines 
that once a standard is adopted there is an irrevocable written commitment to make 
essential IPR available on FRAND terms.   
FRAND can range from RF to a price that is reasonable ex ante, before the industry 
has been locked-in to the market.  The participants, not the SSO, must assess 
whether licence terms are FRAND.146 This may well result in each firm wishing to 
use a standard negotiated separately with the patent holder.  The Guidelines say the 
fees should bear a reasonable relationship with the economic value of the IPR rather 
than a cost-based method as it would be difficult to attribute development costs to 
particular patents.  Comparisons with ex ante pricing by the company for relevant 
patents is one possibility.  Another is an independent expert assessment of the 
“objective centrality and essentiality to the standard at issue of the relevant IPR 
portfolio.”147 Again comparisons can be drawn with other relevant ex ante prices.  
The Guidelines are not exhaustive and no mechanism is provided to resolve 
disputes.  It is recognised that the courts are still the only final arbiters if a 
reasonable royalty cannot be agreed.148 
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The Guidelines try to block a loophole by which the FRAND obligation could be 
sidestepped.  Not only must participants give irrevocable commitments in writing to 
licence any essential IPRs that are adopted by the standard on FRAND terms, but 
also, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the commitment, ensure that when they 
transfer the IPR any transferee is also bound by that commitment, for example by a 
contractual clause.149 This is aimed at preventing a recurrence of the problems that 
arose when IPCom acquired standard-essential patents from Bosch and the FRAND 
commitment did not automatically follow suit.150  The Commission stepped in again, 
and IPCom relented before the opening of formal proceedings.  By doing so the 
Commission recognised that the unrestricted access to essential patents on FRAND 
terms for all third parties safeguards the pro-competitive economic effects of 
standard setting. 
The main aim of the Guidelines is to shape the standardisation process in 
accordance with competition law.  By doing so they fortunately also come to the 
assistance of governments aspiring to reduce costs and lock-in by introducing open 
standards.  The common aim of safeguarding proprietary technology on FRAND 
terms for all third parties is of mutual benefit.  The Commission‟s principle of 
“prevention is better than cure” of identifying IPRs before the industry is locked-in is 
another benefit.151   
Remaining perils include: The Guidelines allow participants to disclose ex ante their 
most restrictive licensing terms.152  The Guidelines do not allow participants to 
negotiate an aggregate royalty rate for a standard,153 so although the individual 
royalty may seem reasonable, the aggregate cost for all the essential patents in a 
standard could be undesirably high, and potentially amount to royalty stacking.  
Without the ability to discuss, in theory each licence has to be negotiated separately 
                                                                                                                                       
release - Antitrust: Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/389&format=HTML&aged=1&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
149
 Guidelines para. 285.  This was highlighted as a potential problem in Knut Blind and others (n 57). 
150
 Commission, Press release „Antitrust: Commission welcomes IPCom's public FRAND declaration‟ 
(December 10, 2009)  MEMO/09/549. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/549&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN 
151
 Sven Sattler (n 131) 349. 
152
 Guidelines para. 299 – the Commission may have hoped that reasonable ex ante rates would be 
disclosed but parties are more likely to disclose a high maximum which could raise aggregate 
royalties rather than lower them -  John Temple Lang, “Patent pools and agreements on standards” 
(2011) 36 (6)  European Law Review 887-895, at 891.     
153
 This can give rise to an abuse of monopsony power by the oligopsonists in the SSO, see Knut 
Blind and others (n 37).  
 
 
 
38 
 
which slows and complicates the process and can lead to secret informal 
discussions.  These arrangements are inefficient and inconsistent with the system of 
patent pooling154 where the parties can discuss and agree an affordable aggregate 
royalty rate.  In practice royalty terms are often set between the patent owner and 
the supplier of technology using the standard.  The end user is not involved although 
the cost will normally be passed on to them.  The Guidelines only apply to standards 
that have market power.155  It could therefore be possible to adopt a standard which 
is not subject to the Guidelines.  Before adopting a standard the terms of the SSO 
must be checked rather than assuming FRAND applies.  
3.2 Public Procurement 
Calls for tenders for IT systems with open standards that come within the threshold 
of public procurement legislation must comply with the Public Procurement Directive 
2004/18/EC156  and Article 23 in particular.  This requires technical specifications to 
afford equal access and not create unjustified obstacles to competition.  The 
Directive specifies in an annex which technical standards can be used, and in which 
order of preference, but any reference to a standard must be accompanied by the 
words “or equivalent”.157  It is said a standard cannot be rejected if it meets the 
performance requirements, regardless of whether it contains IPRs on FRAND 
terms.158 Standards should not be used in a discriminatory fashion that is unjustified 
by the subject matter of the contract.159  Also, unless justified by the subject matter of 
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the contract, calls should not specify products or services by proprietary make or 
IPRs such as trademarks or patents and should not discriminate in favour of 
particular suppliers.  There is evidence that despite this, the use of trademarks is 
widespread.160  The desire for compatibility may lead the procurer to explicitly prefer 
proprietary technology, particularly when it is locked-in.161    
Legal challenges have occurred when public authorities have adopted a policy of 
preferring open source software on the grounds the policy does not meet principles 
of equal treatment and non-discrimination.162  Several attempts to adopt open source 
and/or open standards policies have been moderated so that rather than preferring 
open source, procurement is based on careful consideration of all possible 
alternatives.163 
The Dutch Government‟s action plan “Netherlands in Open Connection”, adopted in 
2007, expresses an explicit "preference for open-source software in the case of 
equal suitability".164  This public procurement policy is said to recognise that it should 
not discriminate between individual vendors but rather adopts a specific business 
model to meet procurement requirements.  The preference for open source is not 
implemented by acquiring specific software applications or by favouring particular 
vendors, but through the functional requirements and award criteria specified in calls 
for tenders.165 
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IT solutions must be designed to fit into the organisation's IT architecture. The IT 
architecture needs of public sector organisations are strongly linked to 
interoperability and open standards. “Public authorities need to be able to define 
their ICT strategies and architectures, including interoperability between 
organisations, and will procure ICT systems/services and products or components 
thereof, that meet their requirements.”166 
Open standards may be essential to interoperability between systems for an 
effective IT architecture.  This is the reason for the emphasis on open standards, and 
at a higher level, interoperability agreements in the European Interoperability 
Framework.167  Open standards requirements can be defined in tenders in terms of 
these functional, technical or business needs, or by referring to standards.  Likewise, 
a requirement to be able to modify and distribute the software and have access to 
the source code would justify specifying open source software on the basis of 
functional, technical and business model requirements.168   
When technical criteria are met, selection is on the basis either of "the lowest price" 
or, where quality and not price alone is the deciding factor, “the most economically 
advantageous from the point of view of the contracting authority".169  It is often said 
that the Total Costs of Ownership (TCO) of software purchases should be 
considered.170  While there may be no licence fee for open source software, other 
costs will apply.  TCO should include all the long-term costs involved in software 
purchases, such as the costs of required regular upgrades, or the exit cost of 
migrating to other software.  These costs can be greater without open standards and 
forward compatibility due to restriction in choice of future suppliers and lock-in.  
TCOs that are narrowly defined can still omit other non-quantifiable costs such as 
the benefits of flexibility, independence and transparency which are essential to a 
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public organisation.  Costs and benefits should be analysed over the long term, 
rather than relying on TCO studies that are too narrowly defined.171 
Research to assess the effect of standards in public procurement failed to prove a 
positive correlation between standards and innovation, but the use of functional or 
performance-based standards can aid innovative bidders.  Development of an open 
standard early in the development of new technology can give the first mover a 
competitive advantage and in the long run increase competition and reduce the cost 
of the innovative technology.  Interoperability standards were also found to have a 
positive influence on innovation.  The reasons that the use of standards in public 
procurement gives these benefits includes opening public markets to innovate 
products by giving the public procurer confidence in the product which disseminates 
the product among public procurers and stimulates further R&D investment.172   
It is recognised that standards must keep pace with rapid technological development 
and that in the IT sector most standards ensuring interoperability are not developed 
by the formal SSOs.  A draft regulation proposes to permit the use of standards set 
by other organisations, commonly referred to as global fora and consortia, to be 
specified in public procurement.  Before adoption the standards will have to comply 
with a set of criteria based on WTO principles.  SMEs and other stakeholders will be 
better represented in European standardisation with financial support available for 
their representation.173 
A policy that precludes FRAND licensing is said to be an obstacle to tenderers reliant 
on royalty-based licensing and may prevent the use of some formal European 
standards which incorporate IPRs.  Such a policy has been seen as an attempt to 
extract essential IPR from market participants at no cost, which is not a legitimate 
policy objective.  Also, because of the size of the market for IT in the public sector, 
affirmative action for RF and open source turns public procurement into a form of 
market intervention.174  An RF open standard policy would however only extend to 
the IPR in the standard itself and standards with RF or FRAND terms both allow 
competition from proprietary suppliers, although the GPL attempts to restrict the 
extent of integration of open source and proprietary software.  The RF terms are 
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limited to the standard and as discussed above the rationale for IPR in software 
standards remains uncertain.         
Interim Conclusion 
The legal framework is complicated but can support a policy of open standards. The 
Guidelines have helped when adopting standards but the SSOs are not responsible 
for agreeing FRAND terms and this remains an area of uncertainty.   Despite a 
FRAND commitment the rise in the incidence of patents in interface standards has 
increased the commercial significance of the standard setting procedure so that the 
standards themselves are a source of income in addition to the market they serve.  
The Commission will only become involved in exceptional cases, for example when 
the patent holder is dominant.  There is no substitute for careful due diligence of the 
SSO and of each standard before adoption. There is evidence that the Procurement 
Directive encourages the use of standards to specify the subject matter of contracts 
and there is evidence that the Directive will accommodate an open standards policy 
based on the functional non-discriminatory requirements of a specific business 
model. 
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4 A Review of the Literature on Certain 
Options for the Implementation of an 
Open Standards Policy 
There are several practical limiting factors that should be recognised, as these will 
reduce the potential benefits of an open standards policy or influence how it should 
be implemented.  These factors are illustrated here but this does not form an 
exhaustive account.  Standards do not guarantee interoperability, indeed many 
standards provide only limited interoperability.  The study by Shah and Kesan on 
compatibility between ODF, OOXML and DOC revealed examples of poor 
compatibility varying from formatting problems to loss of information in pictures, 
footnotes, comments, tracking changes and tables.  Less than 100% interoperability 
may significantly reduce the value of these document formats for some government 
applications such as the archiving of information.175   
Another consideration is whether a single standard should be adopted, and if so 
which one.  Not all standards are successful and it appears that only a few generate 
most of the impact in a “winner takes all” scenario.  Standards that are likely to have 
a high impact can be recognised at the development stage: they are more likely to 
have more participants and more divisive debates.  This can result in longer 
standards, so more complexity and more words can indicate a standard with more 
impact.176  It is said that little research has been done on the impact of competing 
(functionally equivalent) open standards on such matters as interoperability, 
innovation, and the environment and this is not directly addressed in guidance such 
as the Dutch selection procedure and the CAMSS project.177  Egyedi considers that 
selecting two or more functionally equivalent standards is inadvisable as this may 
reduce market transparency, decrease overall interoperability, decrease network 
externalities, decrease ease of use, fragment the market and possibly lead to forms 
of lock-in and increase transaction costs, for example the costs of converters.178  To 
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benefit from network effects it is best to adopt a successful standard.  Early adoption 
of a standard can reduce conversion costs, but ensuring adoption of the right 
standard at the right time is undoubtedly easier said than done.   
Kesan and Shah, analysing Massachusetts‟ adoption of ODF when it was an 
immature standard, promote a policy of “multiple independent interoperable 
implementations” or “running code” to avoid users being locked-in to an open 
standard.179  Sieverding warns against mandating a particular path to interoperability 
which would include adopting a specific standard, open or otherwise, particularly if 
the open standard is immature and unproven.  Doing so may reduce flexibility and 
foreclose other opportunities of benefiting from advances in interoperability and so 
be ineffective and costly.180  Swann also warns against standardisation taking place 
too early in the development cycle which can then exclude alternative and possibly 
superior technology.  Conversely, standardising too late can involve high transition 
costs.  There appears to be a proportional relationship between the number of 
standards and their positive effect on the process of innovation, which is reversed 
when the number of standards rises above a certain number.181  
4.1 Should the Policy Favour RF or Include both RF & FRAND? 
RAND and RF terms for standards were evaluated by the US Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission in 2007.  Opinions varied from those who 
considered RAND to be effective and had no complaints with RAND terms,182 to 
those who considered RAND was not a sufficient safeguard against the abuse of a 
patent that is essential to a standard.183  One of the reasons RAND may be 
inadequate is because terms such as „reasonable‟ and „non-discriminatory‟ are not 
well defined.  Commentators considered „reasonable‟ to be so vague that it did not 
amount to anything,184 and RAND to be an empty term185.  SSOs give little 
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explanation or guidance on what RAND means and there has not been much judicial 
guidance.186   
Additionally, SSOs do not want to become involved in complaints about RAND 
licensing terms.  The absence of a good forum for resolving disputes about RAND 
licensing terms has contributed to problems including patent hold ups.187 
There is doubt as to whether the requirement to licence on FRAND terms is even 
legally enforceable, and this may vary from one jurisdiction to another.  There is no 
agreement as to the terms or mechanism to objectively determine the terms, which 
amount to a “recipe for litigation”.188  It may not be possible to compel the granting of 
FRAND licences in private law  and any remedy that may exist under competition 
law is cumbersome and ex post.  This does of course look at the worst case scenario 
and the industry appears to operate and muddle through although it is questionable 
whether this is adequate when so much depends on reliable standards.     
The Horizontal Guidelines give little further guidance on how FRAND should be 
assessed although it is said that the fees should not be excessive or prevent or 
make it difficult to implement the standard.  It is for the participant not the SSO to 
assess whether the fee fulfils the FRAND commitment.  The Guidelines permit ex 
ante disclosure of the most restrictive licensing terms which may provide a model for 
license fees to be capped in advance.189      
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The most recognised and certain interpretation of RF is of a standard that requires 
all participants to make essential patent claims available on a RF basis.  There are 
however said to be other interpretations which are more difficult to monitor.190 
Only a small minority (4 out of 43) of SSOs that were the subject of a study required 
RF licensing of patents incorporated in standards.191   
RF could be the best means to limit licensing hold up, but it does not obviously 
benefit the patent owner.  Arguably there could be a first mover advantage which 
could favour the IPR holder‟s complementary technologies.192    
There is concern that RF does not provide an efficient incentive to innovate.  
Intellectual property protection is the means by which those who invest in R&D have 
an expectation of achieving a return that is greater than zero.193  The alleged 
connection between software patents and innovation has been discussed above. 
As well as removing the incentive to invest there is concern that mandating RF 
licences, by removing the licensor‟s ability to earn a return from its investment in 
R&D through its intellectual property, is a disincentive to joining the standard.  RF 
raises the technology monopsony concern much more sharply than ex ante 
negotiation of RAND.194   It may be possible to resolve the problem if members are 
not committed to licensing their technology at the outset, but are only obliged to do 
so if they want to take advantage of getting a RF license from the other members by 
agreeing to a reciprocal RF license.195  This gives choice rather than a monopsony, 
but with some organisations there is a commitment on entering to licence all patents, 
and there can be asymmetry where some patents are more valuable than others.196  
RF is implemented in many different ways.197  RF may be appropriate in certain 
technologies, particularly ones less populated by patents or at least few essential 
patents, where there might be unpatented alternatives, and in which case the 
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licensor may be willing to accept RF.198  Reciprocal or cross-licensing is of less value 
in standards than in some patent pools as patents in standards may not be useful in 
the licensee‟s income generating technology.  While there is evidence that RF 
licensing can be preferred even by IPR holders, there is little incentive for pure IPR 
companies, such as NPEs, to participate in RF licensing.  The grant of an RF 
licence, even with a non-assertion clause, does not prevent claims by patent holders 
outside the SSO.  The remedies of defensive patenting, competition law and 
challenging the validity of the patent are expensive and not a complete solution.  
This should not justify abandoning the policy of RF but it does mean that an open 
standard policy that adopts RF does not immediately lose the problems of claims by 
patent holders that are normally associated with FRAND.199   
The European Interoperability Framework v.2.0 opted for a principle of openness 
that requires IPRs to be licensed on FRAND terms or on an RF basis in a way that 
allows implementation in both proprietary and open source software.200  This is 
intended to foster competition between the business models.  While EIF2 includes 
RF within FRAND, it has been said that a policy that prefers RF does not align with 
the first recommendation of EIF2 to align interoperability frameworks to take into 
account the European dimension of public service delivery and contravenes the duty 
of sincere cooperation contrary to the TFEU.  The EU does not have treaty 
competence in the area of organisation and delivery of public services, outside the 
remit of procurement, and cannot legislate in the area of interoperability systems for 
provision of public services.  For this reason a Commission Communication was 
used which is said to have intellectual and moral authority, but is not directly legally 
enforceable.201 
The consultation on Modernising Standards in the EU revealed that IPRs are 
perceived as one of the most critical issues in IT standardisation.  Most of the 
respondents to the consultation supported FRAND policies although several felt 
more clarity, transparency and predictability was required.  Of those supporting 
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FRAND, the majority also supported the inclusion of RF approaches as well.  They 
recognised that business models, other than charging royalties on standards, could 
support further R&D.202  Disadvantages to the FRAND model included the time spent 
negotiating licensing arrangements.   This was seen as out of step with the speed of 
innovation and evolution in the IT domain where the increase in the number of 
patents had dramatically increased the complexity of monitoring the implementation 
of IPR policies.203 
The “Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems” considered that provided there was 
interoperability, open systems should not rely on one software model and the 
ensuing competition between open source and proprietary software could result in 
lower licensing costs and increased innovation.  There was a desire to retain the 
innovative capacity of proprietary suppliers.  Software selection should be based on 
function and scalability as well as the least costly, fastest solution.  However active 
management is needed to realise the benefits of open source software and to ensure 
that enough open source software exists to provide competition.  This should include 
a better understanding and evaluation of open source software, supporting 
collaborative R&D programs based on the open source model, and using open 
source when the business case supports it to achieve a critical user base.204 
There are issues however with the inclusion of a FRAND option.  In markets where 
competing software is implemented by small firms or individuals without significant 
funds, the economic effect of open standards may only be achieved on RF terms.  If 
several standards exist in one product the amount of royalties that have to be paid, 
even under FRAND terms, could harm some competitors.205 Basing standards on RF 
terms, rather than FRAND or other commercial terms, is said to reduce the risk that 
data will become unavailable over time.206     
Some open source licences, such as GNU v.2 and v.3 are considered incompatible 
with FRAND and royalty payments on patents.207  Arguably this is a choice taken by 
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the open source software developer208 and should not of itself prohibit a policy of 
using both FRAND and RF software or even preferring RF.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of this legal incompatibility may be relevant where the main existing or 
potential competitor to proprietary software is open source software.  It can be 
argued that the open standard should be compatible with the development and 
distribution of the open source software‟s licence terms.209      
The incompatibility of FRAND licencing and open source software arose when 
Microsoft was ordered by the Commission to licence interoperability information in 
the form of protocol specifications on RAND terms including remuneration charged.  
When setting the charge Microsoft had to disregard its market power and not impose 
any restriction that could create disincentives to compete or unnecessarily restrain 
innovation.210   
Microsoft ended up with at least two forms of licence.  A „No-Patent Agreement‟ at a 
flat rate royalty fee of €10,000 that was compatible with open source models211 and a 
„Patent Agreement‟ at 0.4 per cent of licensee‟s product revenues.212  One version of 
the „No-Patent Agreement‟, negotiated by SAMBA, amounted to a non-disclosure 
agreement between Microsoft and the Protocol Freedom Information Foundation 
(PFIF) on behalf of open source developers.  In return for a one off fixed fee of 
€10,000 the agreement enabled the PFIF to licence the protocol information for free 
to „subcontracting‟ open source developers.213  The agreement does not include a 
licence of any patents.  Instead it contains a list of patents to inform the PFIF and the 
wider open source community of Microsoft‟s patents related to WSPP.214  The 
subcontractors then know what is patented and hence what to avoid.  In return 
Microsoft agrees not to assert any patents that are not notified in the agreement and, 
crucially for the open source ethos, this non assertion undertaking covers all open 
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source developers involved in WSPP protocols.  This form of agreement was 
compatible with the GPL licence.215     
Adopting a policy which mandates RF standards could reduce choice as the vast 
majority of SSOs have at least one option that allows patent holders to charge on a 
RAND basis.  Governments should appreciate that this could limit the pool of 
standards available to them.  While the intended aims may be laudable, 
governments should be careful that the objectives they have as purchasers of IT are 
not intertwined with objectives the government might have as a market regulator.216  
However, examples of public administrations claiming cost savings and other 
benefits from adopting open source abound.217  It makes good sense to ensure that 
any policy of open standards allows the government to take advantage of the 
benefits it may gain from using open source solutions.   
If FRAND and RF terms, in line with the EIF2 are adopted to help achieve a level 
playing field, a policy should be adopted which promotes the wide dissemination of 
information on open source software and the adoption of pilot projects.  It is argued 
that further government subsidies are not appropriate as open source software is 
under-priced as the contributions to its design and maintenance are voluntary and 
not reflected in the price.218 It should however be borne in mind that, as discussed 
above, problems exist with IPRs in software including granting patents when there 
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has been no innovation.  These problems could be addressed by a number of means 
including improving the patent examination process or some form of exception to 
patent protection for interfaces, but that will require regional and international 
cooperation.  Until that occurs government policy on open standards must be 
designed to make the best of the present arrangements.            
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5 Costs and Benefits of Aspects of the 
Proposed Policy  
5.1 Overview 
Several countries, including The Netherlands, Chile, Japan and Denmark have 
attempted to increase the efficiency of government IT delivery by adopting an open 
standards approach.  This has generally been regarded as a positive development, 
but there is a paucity of hard economic or financial data on the benefits achieved, 
and the adoption of an open standards approach incurs costs as well as benefits.   
The Netherlands incurred a total cost of €8,450,000 in implementing an open 
standards action plan, but expected the total cost for IT migration to be lower in due 
course.    
The cost of adopting open standards is said to be justified by the benefits realised as 
a result although benefits are not always shared equally between departments, or 
always expressed in monetary terms, but can nevertheless be substantial (for both 
individual departments and the public sector as a whole) and include: 
 Savings by making use of generic solutions and avoiding duplicating existing 
work; 
 Improved quality, for instance by making use of unambiguous, reliable 
information; 
 Standardisation, which improves flexibility, as the organisation is better able to 
cooperate with other bodies, citizens and businesses. 219 
 
An audit of the potential savings to be achieved through the use of open standards 
and open source software in the Netherland‟s central government concluded that 
approaching ICT from a purely cost angle is too limited.  Expectations for potential 
savings to be achieved from open technology should be tempered by an approach 
based on clearly defined and unambiguous strategic goals, for example by 
distinguishing between policy goals to improve operational management and policy 
goals to organise the software market.   
Opportunities for migrating to open standards and open source are not universal. 
Advantages and disadvantages, opportunities and risks in each case should be 
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determined after careful study of the circumstances and products available, 
particularly as products change rapidly. 
A cost/benefit analysis took account of implementation, management and other 
operational costs, maintenance costs and procurement costs.  Licence fees 
amounted to only 4% of total ICT costs.  It was unclear whether the analyses 
considered potential costs and benefits associated with lock-in and compatibility.220  
Experience of adopting open standards in higher education found that the intended 
effect of interoperability and reduced lock-in were not always achieved although this 
may have been due to non technical factors such as the specification process being 
driven by the vendors.  Other issues were patent claims and adopting standards too 
early in the development of a technology which can impact innovation and the 
development of the standard.  As a result of these experiences a pragmatic, 
contextualised approach is recommended where the policy of open standards is 
designed to fit the context and is combined with the dissemination of user experience 
and a support and quality assurance framework.221           
Although the public sector is by far the largest procurer of ICT services in Europe, 
the standards set by the fora and consortia, with a few exceptions, are not formally 
approved and cannot yet be specified in public procurement. 
Each standard created by the European SSOs (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI) costs 
about €1million, and can take 24 to 36 months or longer to finalise.222 This sum 
includes the cost of experts, organisation of meetings, travel etc which is financed 
primarily by industry (93-95%) with the remainder paid by national governments and 
the European Commission. An estimated 80% of the ICT standardisation work since 
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the 1980s has been done by informal fora and consortia worldwide223 as they have 
the required specialised expertise.224  Between the 1980s and 2004 about 70,000 
standards were developed in the ICT Industry.  Growth is expected to continue.225 
5.2 Open Standards Reduce the Size and Duration of ICT Projects 
Modularity – managing complexity by breaking complex systems into discrete 
components which can then communicate with one another only through 
standardized interfaces226 – is made possible in systems using open standards. 
Components based on open standards help implementers and end users integrate 
new components with existing systems.227  When combined with a “service 
orientated” approach this can give a low risk way of retaining useful legacy systems 
that work with new components.228  
Increasing the modularity of systems brings important benefits.  The possibility of 
smaller companies becoming involved in modular IT projects increases the choice of 
contractor available to the customer.  Errors are said to reduce with decreasing 
program size so smaller programs are less likely to have errors than larger ones – 
not only per program but also per line of code.229  Reusing smaller software modules 
is therefore a valid method of reducing programming errors.230    
                                            
223
 CEN currently counts some 238 fora and consortia, but does not include the most patently 
commercially-motivated ones. Other private sources that do not do any such screening list a total of 
534. www.consortiuminfo.org/links 
224
 For Fora and consortia such as OASIS, OMG, W3C, ETSI, and ISO/IEC/JTC1, the time is normally 
12 -24 months from new to completion if they are seeking consensus but in extreme cases can be 6 
months.  They prefer solutions from concrete industry practice which give a high level of 
interoperability.  Unlike the SSOs they do not require formal national ratification and draft 
specifications or standards are normally available for comment over the internet at an early draft 
stage although formal voting remains restricted to members.  Timothy Simcoe “Delay and de jure 
standardization: exploring the slowdown in Internet standards development” in Shane Greenstein and 
Victor Stango (eds) Standards and Public Policy (Cambridge, 2007).  
225
 Impact Assessment on Proposal for a Regulation on European Standardisation, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, (final SEC(2011) 671). 
226
 Richard Langlois (n 31) 19. 
227
 Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems, Berkman Centre for Internet and Society 27. 
228
 Ibid, 27. 
229
 Mark Lemley and David O‟Brien, “Encouraging Software Reuse” (1997) 49 Stanford Law Review” 
255 from Kevin Kelly, “Out of Control: The new Biology of Machines, Social Systems and the 
Economic World” 194-95 (1994). 
230
 Ibid, 265. 
 
 
 
55 
 
Modularity may reduce the tendency for companies or consortia to bid excessively 
low in order to ensure that they are not on the wrong side of an “all or nothing” 
contract decision, relying on modifications during the course of the contract to make 
a reasonable return.  
5.3 Open Standards Avoid or Reduce Switching Costs Associated with 
Lock-in 
Open standards can contribute to the avoidance of lock-in to a single supplier.  An 
illustration is the electronic information exchange platform developed by the Chilean 
government, based on XML, SOAP and Web Services, to integrate the platforms of 
various public agencies, to ensure the information is available to its citizens.231 
Lock-in and switching costs, described earlier, are reduced or eliminated if open 
standards are adopted.  The total costs associated with installing new software (such 
as an ERP system) are normally eleven times greater than the software itself.  The 
additional costs include infrastructure upgrades, consultants, and retraining 
programs etc.232 In 2006, the Danish Government decided that the balance of risk 
associated with having all software solutions in the hands of a few suppliers had 
tipped and outweighed the perceived risks associated with the move to open 
standards.233       
However, even with open standards there can still be switching costs if multiple 
standards are used.  The costs can vary from the normal switching costs to the costs 
for converters.234  
The “bargain then rip-off” model associated with vendor lock-in is avoided as open 
standards avoid lock-in to a particular supplier.  This could result in a decrease in the 
discount offered on the initial contact as the supplier would not be able to charge a 
premium when supplying further software or services.  This would increase the initial 
cost of switching to new software but, as future procurement will remain competitive, 
there should not be an increase in the total cost of ownership.       
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5.4 Open Standards Increase Competition and Opportunities for 
Smaller Companies and Increase Innovation 
Combining open standards with appropriate procurement practices can improve 
opportunities for smaller companies.  Specifying a set of services based around an 
open standard means that fewer individual companies can meet all the requirements 
of the proposal.  This encourages consortia which can include SMEs.   
Open standards encourage growth by allowing resources to focus on innovation, 
building on existing protocols. Publishing open standards, as part of a framework for 
government interoperability policy and procedures, is considered to improve 
awareness and enable suppliers to build applications to meet those requirements.  
However it is recommended that the open standards rule is pragmatic, as restricting 
procurement to only officially approved standards can inhibit the adoption of new 
technologies.  
Those already using open standards consider there is greater competition among 
suppliers for products and services thus helping government to improve performance 
and financial efficiency.  Open standards strengthen the bargaining position of 
buyers and give end users more choice when setting requirements and performance 
criteria.235   
The introduction of more informal fora and consortia, using the open standard model, 
to the public procurement process is expected to benefit the public procurer.  It will 
lead to greater competition among suppliers, products and services, and this should 
translate into lower costs.  It is also expected to create business opportunities for 
SMEs as they could build on existing protocols and procedures and innovate with 
lower costs and diminished technological and market assessment risks. In 
standardised and modular markets, SMEs would have greater opportunities to 
provide add-ons and applications. It is expected to have a marginal impact on 
innovation.236    
Various studies showed that although SMEs need to use standards, they encounter 
a series of problems when doing so due to their size and limited resources. SMEs 
have difficulties in choosing the right standard, in understanding it and in 
implementing it.  Furthermore the cost is relatively high for SMEs and is increasingly 
cited as a problem by SMEs and other stakeholders.237   
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According to the regional government of Andalusia the use of open source software 
over six years has saved millions of Euros and has brought other benefits.  These 
benefits include providing local companies with an opportunity to become more 
competitive and offering better support through their detailed knowledge of open 
source software and development processes which has nurtured the local IT 
software sector. 
5.5 Reuse of and Sharing ICT Solutions Across Departments Reduces 
Costs and Inefficiencies 
Software has a reinvention culture – it tends to be rewritten for new tasks rather than 
built on existing components and methods.238  Software reuse has been defined as 
the process of creating software systems from predefined software components.239  
In order to reuse software, “artefacts” in the form of code, system architecture, 
documentation, and user interfaces must be created from existing software 
systems.240  
The culture of avoiding reuse leads to increased costs and inefficiency.  Hewlett-
Packard (HP) found that a project to reuse code gave productivity improvements of 
up to 57%.241  Indirect costs are also reduced, as newly created software modules 
exhibit much higher error rates than software that has been used many times and 
debugged.242  Reuse can also help bring products to market more quickly or reduce 
the completion time of projects.243 
While reuse projects may occur within software companies, external reuse in any 
systematic way by other organisations, even large corporations, is uncommon.244  
There appears to be a good case for software reuse for the user as well as for the 
producer, provided there is an internal or external market to justify the additional cost 
associated with creating reusable software.  One problem is that a user can easily 
copy and distribute components without payment, albeit unlawfully.  The incentive for 
producers of component software will diminish if there is inadequate protection and 
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enforcement of their IPRs.  The challenge for encouraging reuse by users is a 
possible lack of interoperability and a lack of standards.245   
Sharing software may allow for more centralised systems, thus avoiding the 
duplication of overhead costs.  Cost savings of sharing “back office” functions in the 
private sector has typically exceeded 20 per cent, with a less than five year payback.  
However, a project to implement shared services following the Gershon Review 
2004 failed to achieve cost savings.  Planned benefits of £159 million cost savings 
by 2010/2011 were not achieved.  Causes included the excessive complexity of 
services overly tailored to customer needs.  Limited standardisation led to 
inefficiencies such as overheads for running multiple systems and processes.  Costs 
to establish, maintain and upgrade were high.  The need to simplify and standardise 
systems and reduce customisation was recognised.246  In contrast, the Danish 
Government‟s initiative to centralise government ordering and invoicing using open 
standards is expected to lead to annual savings of 160 million Euros.247 
The European Interoperability Framework recommends that public administrations 
should reuse and share solutions to benefit from the work of others and use 
solutions that have proven their value elsewhere.  Reuse and sharing should lead to 
cooperation and collaborative platforms and more efficient development of public 
services.248  Initiatives to promote reuse and sharing include Joinup, which is a 
platform to support and encourage the collaborative development and re-use of 
publicly-financed, free, libre and Open-Source Software (F/OSS) applications for use 
in European public administrations.249  
Open standards can also extend the life of hardware when, as in the following 
examples they are combined with open source software.   
The City of Munich is said to have achieved cost savings of over €4m in one year by 
switching from a proprietary supplier to open source Linux.  A third of the IT 
department‟s budget was saved by switching to Linux and OpenOffice.  It is reported 
that not only was the costs of purchasing new proprietary software and upgrading 
systems achieved at a saving of €15m but a further cost of €2.8m for licence renewal 
was also avoided.  Support calls to help desks fell from 70 a month to 46.  In addition 
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the City continued to use its existing hardware as Linux did not “stress” the system.  
Extending the life of hardware not only avoids cost, but can also have environmental 
benefits by avoiding waste.250  The reported cost savings are said to take account of 
retraining and porting costs.  It is reported that other European governments are 
examining such schemes.251 
The French Gendarmerie calculates that its plan to move some 85,000 PCs across 
4,500 police stations from proprietary software to open source software saves €2 
million per year in licence fees as well as saving money on hardware, as they no 
longer need 4,500 dedicated servers and can simplify maintenance.252  
5.6 Business and Consumer Interfaces with the Government  
It is considered that open standards encourage collaborative partnerships as they 
can access standard specifications, supporting material and code.  This will 
encourage communities that work together to share knowledge, develop 
competencies and innovate.  The Internet is a good example of an open public-
private collaboration.253  It is said that governments could use open standards to 
generate clusters of collaboration by improving communication and collaboration 
between the research community, business and investors.  The improved open 
infrastructure can also attract new research and business.254  
Business, consumers and other end users of government services as well as 
developers and suppliers can contribute to the design, implementation and 
maintenance of open systems.  Their voices will provide essential input and 
feedback and they may contribute skills and services.255   
The adoption of open standards should avoid the practice of requiring citizens who 
access public services to purchase systems from specific suppliers.  This practice 
disadvantages citizens and harms competition and amounts to granting certain 
suppliers a state-sanctioned monopoly,256  and could also harm the democratic 
                                            
250
 See also Gerry Gavigan, “Public Sector ICT Royalty Free Open Standards” (April 2012) Open 
Source Consortium, on environmental and other benefits from open standards. 
251
 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/03/29/munich_linux_savings/ 
252
 http://www.canonical.com/sites/default/files/active/Casestudy-GendarmerieNationale.pdf 
253
 Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems,  Berkman Centre for Internet and Society.  
254
 Ibid, 30. 
255
 Ibid, 32. 
256
 Rishab Ghosh (n 161). 
 
 
 
60 
 
process by influencing the functioning and transparency of the process and how 
citizens engage with it.257        
Other social benefits arising from open standards include greater access and digital 
inclusion as the challenge presented by the cost of providing software to citizens can 
be controlled.258  Better access to information for citizens improves transparency and 
the efficient use of data.259 Improved technical interoperability is important for 
government roles in disaster response and the archiving of public documents.260   
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6 Conclusion 
 
Although there is a lack of quantitative evidence on expected cost savings from 
adopting open standards, abundant examples exist where an open standards policy 
has been adopted with various consequent benefits, and the literature identifies few 
downside risks.  The challenges appear to lie in the manner of implementation so 
that potential pitfalls, such as adopting the wrong standard, are avoided while 
potential gains from increased interoperability, including more competitive 
procurement and benefits to SMEs and citizens are maximised.  Conventionally, 
adopting the “right” single standard has been seen as the best approach but it is less 
certain whether this remains the case.  Open standards should give more 
interoperability both within and possibly with other standards, and mandating one 
standard may merely replace supplier lock-in with standard lock-in while missing the 
benefits to users of optimising their choice of software.  It is recommended that there 
should be further research in this area of implementation.  Another area for 
consideration is what RF and FRAND policy should be adopted.  Adopting FRAND 
can be justified in certain applications on the ground that while it may not be 
compatible with some OSS, it leaves the widest range of options available, but there 
are considerable risks as the owners of the IPR will have rights (magnified by being 
part of a standard) which could conflict with users‟ interests. The use of RF 
standards where available and commercially viable has advantages and should be 
encouraged.  Policies that might be adopted include preferring RF standards or a 
more general policy of encouraging open standards (coupled with a policy of 
encouraging open source software to increase competition) in public procurement 
through dissemination of information and pilot projects. 
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